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consideration. In Manley v. Georgia,11 a statutel2 very similar to the one
under which the appellant was convidted was held unconstitutional. That
statute provided that "every insolvency of a bank shall be deemed fraudu-
lent, and the directors shall be severally punished * * *; provided that
the defendant * * * may repel the presumption of fraud by showing
that the affairs of the bank have been fairly and legally administered."
The statute then defines "insolvency," adopting a definition quite similar to
the one set out by the trial court in the principal case. The Supreme Court
said that this statute contravened the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because the presumption was arbitrary in that there was not
a rational connection between the fact to be proved and that to be inferred.
It was pointed out that proof of any one of the conditions described as
insolvency would, under such a statute, give rise to a presumption of fraud.
It is submitted that the court could not consistently hold that there is
not sufficient connection between the fact of insolvency so defined, and the
fact that such insolvency was caused by fraud, and at the same time say
that there is enough connection between the fact that a bank has closed
within thirty days after the receipt of a deposit, and the fact that such
deposit was received with fraudulent intent. It is true that the Indiana
court in the principal case repudiated the definition of insolvency con-
tained in the Georgia Statute. But under the Indiana statute it is not the
fact of insolvency which gives rise to the presumption, but the fact that
the bank suspends within thirty days after the deposit has been received.
An examination of the Indiana banking laws will show that the banking de-
partment, in which is vested a great deal of discretion, can close a bank
because of the existence of the very conditions described as insolvency in the
Georgia statute and held to be insufficiently connected with fraud by the
United States Supreme Court.'3
W. H. H.
INTOXICATING LIQUOR-TRANSPORTATION-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCF--
When officers first saw the, appellant, he was standing by the side of an
automobile and Gambino was repairing a tire. When the officers returned,
the appellant and Gambino drove away. Later, when the appellant was
arrested, he was riding in the car with Gambino, the confessed owner there-
of, in which there was found hidden from view one hundred and thirty
gallons of liquor, which was being transported. Appellant was tried and
convicted in the circuit court of Cass county on a charge of transporting
liquor under the Indiana statute.' Appellant appealed, assigning as error,
the overruling of his motion for a new trial, by challenging the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the conviction. Held, evidence was insufficient
to support the conviction.2
Evidence showed that appellant was an Italian by birth, who has resided
in Grand Rapids for almost four years and at the time of the arrest was a
hitch-hiker on his way to Indianapolis to look for work, when he was per-
- (1929), 279 U. S. 1, 49 Sup. Ct. 215.
2Sec. 28, Art. 20, Georgia Banking Act of 1919.
"See See. 3965, Burns' Indiana Statutes, 1929 Sup.
23Burns' 1. S. (1926), See. 2720.
2 Iinpellizeri v. State, Supreme Court of Indiana, June 10, 1932.
RECENT CASE NOTES
mitted to ride by Gambino, who was also a resident of Grand Rapids and
the confessed owner of the car in which the liquor was being transported
and the defendant was riding when the arrest was made. Evidence did not
show that the defendant had any interest in the liquor or the car in which
it was being transported or that the defendant conspired with, aided,
abetted or encouraged the actor in the commission of the crime charged or
that there was any other act of participation on the part of the defendant.
An analysis of the facts and a study of related or similar criminal acts
support the decision of the higher court in its reversal of the lower court.
When the meaning of a word is not clearly defined in the statute, the rule
is that the ordinary meaning of the words, used in the statute, is adopted,
and transportation, under the Indiana Statute,3 has been interpreted to
mean "to carry and convey from one place to another."4 There was an act
of transportation in the instant case,5 but the evidence shows only the
presence of the appellant, when arrested, and mere presence of a person at
a place, when another commits a crime, is not sufficient evidence to prove
his guilt, unless he is shown to have conspired with, aided, abetted or en-
couraged the actor in the commission of the crime.6 Applying the same
rule to the specific crime of transportation of liquor, it follows that some-
thing more than mere presence in an automobile, which is being used to
transport liquor, is required to prove one guilty of the charge of transporta-
tion of liquor.7
Murray v. States and Howard v. Commonwealth9 held that evidences,
sufficient to sustain the conviction of one defendant, was not sufficient to
sustain the conviction of his guest or traveling companion, unless it was
shown that he was interested in the liquor, its purchase or in the automobile
used to convey it. The decision of the higher court is further supported by
analogies drawn from other criminal acts. Mere presence at a still is not
sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for the crime of manufacturing
liquor.1 0 There must be some act of participation on the part of the de-
fendant." The same rule is invoked to sustain a conviction on a charge of
possession of liquor, in which case, a conscious and substantial possession
3 Indiana Acts, 1923, Chapter 34, Section 1, page 105.
4 Boyer v. State (1908), 169 Ind. 691, 83 N. E. 360.
Impellieri v. State, Supreme Court of Indiana, June 10, 1932.
Burns' R. S. (1926), Sec. 2028-29; Rasnake v. Commonwealth (1923), 135 Va.
677, 115 S. E. 543; Carey v. State (1924), 194 Ind. 626, 144 N. E. 22.
7 Richardson v. State (1921), 89 Tex. Crim. App. 17, 228 S. W. 1094; Simpson
v. State (1925), 195 Ind. 633, 146 N. E. 747; State v. Peters (1928), (Alo.),6 S. W.
(2nd) 838; Henson v. City of Malvern (1930), (Ark.), 29 S. W. (2nd) 1079; Payne
v. State (1931), (Tex.), 46 S. W. (2nd) 316.
3 (1917), 19 Ariz. 49, 165 Pac. 315.
0 (1924), 138 Va. 835, 122 S. E. 112.
V Guytou v. State (1921). 21 Ga. App. 639, 109 S. &. 520; Biddle v. State
(1924), 19 Ala. App. 560, 99 S. E. 59, Farmer v. State (1924), 19 Ala. App. 563,
99 S. E. 59.
IILeedy v. Commonwealth (1927), (Ky.), 294 S. W. 164; Taylor v. State
(1927), (Okla.). 255 Pac. 714; Bowlin v. State (1931), (Ala.), 132 So. 600; Graerf-
fo v. United States (1931), (Pa.), 46 Fed. (2nd) 852.
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is required.' 2 Reynolds v. State's defines such possession, as having per-
sonal charge or exercising ownership, management or control over liquor.
To invoke any other rule in a criminal act, might involve an innocent per-
son, who, without choice, might be present at the commission of the most
heinous crime and a person, who violates the prohibition law, should have
the same consideration in the courts, as one charged with any other crimi-
nal act.
In the instant case, 14 evidence, in its most favorable light to the state,
proved only the presence of the defendant, as a passenger, and no convic-
tion of a passenger for transportation of liquor in an automobile should
be sustained, unless there is some evidence of his single or joint ownership,
possession or control thereof, or of his aiding, abetting, or encouraging
another in the crime of transportation of liquor. Such evidence should not
only be consistent with his guilt, but should be inconsistent with and ex-
clude every other hypothesis or belief of innocence. It has been supported
by many decisions that unless there is substantial evidence of facts, which
exclude every other hypothesis or belief than that of guilt, it is the duty of
the trial judge to direct the jury to return a verdict for the accused, and
where all the evidence is as consistent with innocence as with guilt, it is the
duty of the appellate court to reverse a judgment against the accused.15
J. H. H.
REAL PROPERTY-CONDITIONS SUBSEQUENT IN DEnms-This action was
brought to eject appellees from certain real estate and quiet title thereto.
Appellees, by cross-complaint, seek to quiet title as against appellants. On
October 11, 1880, N and his wife "conveyed and warranted" to the trustees
of X church "and their successors in office" the real estate in question
(one-half acre of land in consideration of thirty dollars) "in trust that said
premises shall be kept and maintained as a place of worship for the use of
X church, the building to be erected thereon free for all funeral services at
all times and under all circumstances. It shall also be free for all orthodox
denominations when not desired for use by the above named church."
A church was built, half on this half acre and half on the adjoining lot.
April 21, 1930, the trustees conveyed the property to the appellees with
covenants of warranty.
Appellants being sole heirs of N and his wife, both deceased, claim that
the deed given by N and his wife granted an estate in trust upon condi-
tions subsequent only and that the conveyance by the trustees to the appel-
'2Beander v. Barnett (1921), (Calif.), 255 U. S. 224; State v. Harris (1923),
(Ore.), 211 Pac. 944; Nelson v. State (1925), (Wis.), 203 N. W. 343; State v. Gates
(1925), (N. D.), 204 N. W. 350; Clayton v. State (1927), (Ala.), 114 So. 787; Jelks
v. State (1927), (Ga.), 137 S. E. 840; State v. Anno (1927). (Mo. App.), 296 S.
W. 825.
'3Reynolds v. State (1926), (Fla.), 111 So. 285.
24Impellizeri v. State, Supreme Court of Indiana, June 10, 1932.
15 Hart v. United States (1898), 84 Fed. 799; Vernon v. United States (1906),
146 Fed. 121; Tucker v. United States (1915), 224 Fed. 833; Weiner v. United
States (1922), 282 Fed. 799; Sullivan v. United States (1922), 282 Fed. 575; Yu8em
v. United States (1925), 8 Fed. (2nd) 6; Noscowitz v. United States (1922), 282
Fed. 575; Ridenour v. United States (1926), 14 Fed. (2nd) 888; Van Gordner v.
United States (1927), 21 Fed. (2nd) 939; Salinger v. United States (1927), 23 Fed.
(2nd) 48.
